Explore and monitor how Geo-economics is affecting economies, industries and global issues
Get involved with our crowdsourced digital platform to deliver impact at scale
Stay up to date:
Despite some early success, the mobile money industry’s future remains unclear as many markets remain slow to ignite. Starting mobile money operations for either a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) or a bank is expensive, complex, and relatively high risk. As a result, mobile financial systems in developing countries tend to be dominated by a few large players, mostly mobile operators. This dynamic often reduces incentives for the dominant firm to lower prices or innovate. In the end, these market dynamics are an obstacle to financial inclusion as customers tend to use mobile money systems infrequently, for a limited range of applications, and in the end continue to rely mainly on cash.
In a recent paper, David Evans and Alexis Pirchio, two economists from the University of Chicago and Global Economics Group, identified four layers in mobile payments platforms where competition bottlenecks can occur:
Connectivity: in Zimbabwe, EcoCash was investigated because they created a separate Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) protocol for banks to offer their transfer services at a much higher price than what Econet was charging those connected to EcoCash.
Agent network: Recently, in Kenya Airtel filed a complaint with the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) to force Safaricom to remove the exclusive arrangements with its agents. The CAK ordered Safaricom to open up its network to other players and prohibited Safaricom from charging extra for outside access.
Accounts: In Kenya, an M-Pesa customer can send money to a non-Safaricom phone, but the recipient cannot store the money in their mobile wallet. Instead, they must withdraw the money as cash from a Safaricom agent.
Applications: the mobile money provider can be a bottleneck for value-added services as it can usually decide whether or not to allow the service to access its communications, accounts, and agent network platforms, as it is also the case in Kenya with M-Pesa right now.
Moreover, the data exhaust created by the use of digital financial services by the poor can also be used by firms to propose better services and deals, improved credit access, etc. This question of data ownership cuts across these four layers and constitutes a fifth level of competition analysis.
So what can countries do to navigate complex competition issues?
In this recent paper, I try to address this question.
The lack of competition is hard to address as regulators are wrestling with complex market incentives. On the one hand, a monopoly incentivizes the dominant player to invest and this is something the regulator will want to preserve; on the other hand, a monopoly prevents market players to enter the market, reduce prices or innovate for customers, and this what the regulator will want to address.
Some of the questions in-country regulators are wrestling with are: (i) When is the right time to intervene? (ii) Which intervention will foster competition and accompany the market, without stalling its growth? (iii) Which regulatory agency will have jurisdictions over the claim or dispute?
Governments, regulators and investors could work together to foster in-country competition by setting in motion various types of activities.
For instance, they could help strengthen the mobile money capacity or expertise of competition authorities. Competition authorities often lack the right expertise to address competition bottlenecks in mobile money markets. This expertise would empower them to prioritize mobile money investigations as they arise, push back possible political interference and, bring credibility to their investigations and decisions.
They could also promote regulatory coordination between all three regulators by by providing a forum to discuss a coordinated strategy.
They could help boost in-country and global mobile money competition ecosystem. Regulators will face similar issues in many markets so efforts should be made to both extract and share lessons globally and to link policy makers together to share experiences and knowledge. New mechanisms or institutions may be needed to allow competition authorities and others to share knowledge and experiences across markets.
Finally, aside from regulatory interventions, innovations could disrupt the market power of leading incumbents and alter in-market competition dynamics. For instance, in India, disruptive startups such asNovopay, a payment and banking solution, using small neighborhood retail stores as business correspondent to open bank accounts and provide cash-in and cash-out services, allows several financial services providers to use the same agent network. Another example is the LevelOne Project initiated by the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation’s which aims to guide all digital financial services players (both mobile and banks) towards a common digital payment infrastructure inclusive of the poor.
How do you think competition issues are affecting the mobile money landscape? What interventions would foster competition without stalling market growth? What is the role of the donor community in this space?
These questions will generate much debate over the years to come.
This article is published in collaboration with The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Publication does not imply endorsement of views by the World Economic Forum.
To keep up with the Agenda subscribe to our weekly newsletter.
Author: Elisa Sitbon is an Associate Program Officer for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Financial Services for the Poor team.
Image: A customer conducts a mobile money transfer. REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya.
Don't miss any update on this topic
Create a free account and access your personalized content collection with our latest publications and analyses.
License and Republishing
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the World Economic Forum.
More on Geo-economicsSee all
March 1, 2024
February 28, 2024
Karin Strohecker, Jorgelina Do Rosario and Libby George
February 26, 2024
February 23, 2024
February 20, 2024
February 19, 2024