Geographies in Depth

EU markets are more competitive than the US, according to new research

This article is published in collaboration with NBER Digest.
U.S. President Donald Trump and President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker speak about trade relations in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, U.S., July 25, 2018.      REUTERS/Joshua Roberts

The decline in U.S. market competitiveness has had meaningful consequences for U.S. consumers Image: REUTERS/Joshua Roberts - RC11C2109FC0

Dwyer Gunn
Share:
Our Impact
What's the World Economic Forum doing to accelerate action on Geographies in Depth?
The Big Picture
Explore and monitor how European Union is affecting economies, industries and global issues
A hand holding a looking glass by a lake
Crowdsource Innovation
Get involved with our crowdsourced digital platform to deliver impact at scale
Stay up to date:

European Union

Since 2000, gross profit rates in the United States have risen and industry concentration has soared, but these trends are not found in the European Union.

Until the late 1990s, most U.S. markets were viewed as highly competitive relative to their international counterparts. Many European countries implemented U.S.-style free market regulatory models during this time period.

Image: NBER

In How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than U.S. Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift (NBER Working Paper No. 24700), Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon argue that over the last two decades, U.S. markets have gradually become less competitive, and that, because this trend was not echoed in Europe, European markets today are actually more competitive than those in the United States. In many cases, the EU markets exhibit lower levels of industry concentration and excess profitability, as well as fewer regulatory barriers to entry.

Have you read?

The researchers find that starting around 2000, gross profit rates in the United States began to increase while the labor share declined. These developments are much more muted in the EU. A similar trend is observed in measures of industry concentration.

The researchers explore whether industry composition drove the divergence in concentration. They consider whether the emergence of high-tech industries drove the broad increase in concentration observed in the United States. They discount that explanation, noting that "the rise in U.S. concentration since 2000 is pervasive across most sectors, just as the stability/decline in EU concentration is." Industries that experienced significant increases in concentration in the United States, such as telecom and airlines, did not experience parallel changes in the EU.

In the airline industry, the researchers find, the "rise in U.S. concentration and profits closely aligns with a controversial merger wave that includes Delta-Northwest (2008), United-Continental (2010), Southwest-AirTran (2011) and American-US Airways (2014)."

They suggest that the divergence in market competitiveness between the U.S. and Europe is related to the powers granted to EU regulatory institutions at their inception. They note that both the European Central Bank and the Directorate-General for Competition were given more political independence than parallel institutions in the United States and thus have been able to pursue more aggressive antitrust enforcement in recent years. In the U.S. between 1996 and 2008, they write, the Federal Trade Commission "...essentially stopped enforcing mergers when the number of remaining competitors is 5 or more."

In all areas of antitrust the researchers find decreasing enforcement in the United States and increasing enforcement in the EU. The Directorate-General for Competition is more likely to pursue "abuse of dominance" cases than is the U.S. authority, and financial penalties in cartel cases tripled as a share of EU GDP between 2000 and 2016.

The decline in U.S. market competitiveness has had meaningful consequences for U.S. consumers, the researchers point out. Broadband internet prices in the U.S., for example, are significantly higher than in the EU, where the telecom industry is less concentrated.

They buttress their case for the comparative lack of political independence of U.S. regulatory bodies by noting the higher levels of both lobbying and campaign contributions in the U.S. than in the EU. Political campaign contributions are 50 times higher in the U.S. than in the EU.

Don't miss any update on this topic

Create a free account and access your personalized content collection with our latest publications and analyses.

Sign up for free

License and Republishing

World Economic Forum articles may be republished in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License, and in accordance with our Terms of Use.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the World Economic Forum.

Share:
World Economic Forum logo
Global Agenda

The Agenda Weekly

A weekly update of the most important issues driving the global agenda

Subscribe today

You can unsubscribe at any time using the link in our emails. For more details, review our privacy policy.

EU falling short of digital transformation goals, new report finds

David Elliott

July 19, 2024

About Us

Events

Media

Partners & Members

  • Sign in
  • Join Us

Language Editions

Privacy Policy & Terms of Service

© 2024 World Economic Forum