What does Scotland mean for other independence bids?

Scotland’s Yes camp shed its tears, bade farewell to its leader and shelved the issue of sovereignty indefinitely. But its failed independence bid, far from suppressing yearnings for more self rule elsewhere, foreshadows an increase in strains to national unity across the globe that will intensify pressure on central governments to devolve more power to regions.

While mature secessionist movements already exist in Spain, Canada and beyond, strong economic, political and cultural forces will arouse new and nascent aspirations for more autonomy in other countries.

It may not have been apparent to many why some Scots would seek their own nation: they speak the same language as the rest of Britain, their income is similar, they have their own parliament and are responsible for health, law and order, education and other matters. But nationalists argued, unsuccessfully, that an independent Scotland would be more responsive to its people and that they would be more prosperous on their own.

In dozens and dozens of countries, regions either fear the erosion of their cultures, speak different languages, are frustrated by having to finance what they perceive as economic laggards in their nation, are given short shrift by central authorities or don’t share the vision of the national government.

That will become more acute due to a number of forces, the most predominant of which is globalization. Both products of globalization — those who benefit and those who don’t — can and do justify the search for more control of their destinies.

“The concept of the unitary state is going to become much more difficult except for a very small country,” Stephen Tindale, associate fellow at the Center for European Reform, an independent think tank, said from London. “It does augur increased pressure on central governments to change the (political) relationship” with regions.

Trade pacts reduce dependence on national markets

First, to the beneficiaries of globalization: the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral free trade deals has opened markets and reduced the economic dependence of many communities on consumers in their own countries.

Look to the European Union and Spain’s wealthy northeastern region of Catalonia. After Scotland’s vote, Catalan legislators overwhelmingly gave the region’s leader the power to call a secession referendum on Nov. 9, which the central government in Madrid refuses to recognize. With its own language and culture, Catalonia is spurred on by the economic crisis that gripped the EU, by the perceived inflexibility of the central government over its demands, and by opportunity.

“Globalization in Europe presents an opportunity,” Jordi Solé, the secretary general of the Brussels-based European Free Alliance, a coalition of 40 nationalist and autonomist parties, told me. “It reduces the economic risks of creating new states. Solé, a member of the Catalan parliament, explained that two or three decades ago the main market for Catalan goods was Spain. But the formation of the EU lowered barriers to enter other countries and most of Catalonia’s products are now consumed outside of Spain.

That notion, however, assumes that breakaway regions would continue to benefit from free trade accords negotiated by their central governments, which is far from assured.

While the secessionist yearnings in Catalonia, Quebec, Flanders and northern Italy are better known, there are many more that will be inspired by Scotland and empowered by the new global economic order: for example, the European Free Alliance includes an Alsatian movement from France, Hungarians in the Slovak Republic and the Macedonian communities in Greece and Bulgaria. Alliance members want varying levels of greater autonomy, some stopping short of full independence. They are emboldened by history: the number of countries has nearly quadrupled from the 51 original member states of the United Nations in 1945 to 193 today.

On the flip side of globalization, existing and new free trade agreements being forged, along with continued technological progress, will expose weaker regions and sectors. The fear is not only of economic loss. It is also of the erosion of identity. And some of those vulnerable communities may look to ensure more control of their destinies.

“Europeans are once again mobilizing around traditional identities, this time amid the insecurities of globalization,” former British prime minister Gordon Brown wrote in an op-ed piece before Scots voted. Brown, a Scot and a vocal campaigner for the “No” camp in the vote, said Scots were wondering whether the Conservative-led Britain “is capable of uniting Britain around a common project and shared purpose for the global era.” Are there, he asked, shared ideas that bind them together “in the manner of America (land of liberty and opportunity) and France (liberté, egalité, fraternité),” adding: “Globalization creates a complex 21st century challenge. There is a fear that if you integrate you may lose your identity and yet also an ancillary fear that clinging to your identity may cut you off from the world’s opportunities.”

Mobility will boost cultural diversity and demands to preserve identity

Another by-product of globalization is increased mobility. More people are on the move across borders, toward nations they hope will improve their lives, thereby enriching the receiving countries with a diversity of cultures and languages. But that will create some social tensions where assimilation into local communities is difficult or undesired by those newcomers. With joblessness high in some areas, some countries receiving them are not as likely to see the benefits of immigration — heightening social tensions and widening inequality. That, too, increases the likelihood that communities and regions feeling dispossessed will seek control of their own destiny.

The identity of a nation is forged and changed over time and not overnight. The way governments adapt to demographic changes, with inclusive policies that reflect that, will have a strong bearing on how satisfied communities are with their ability to preserve their identities and futures while allowing their newly-adopted countries to benefit from the growing plurality.

Americans, who won their independence at the point of a bayonet and not a ballot box more than two centuries ago, should not underestimate the exhilarating hope and shuddering dread that grips a populace that must decide whether to cleave itself from the whole or muddle on with the knowledge that a nation, while imperfect, is better united than divided. The collective memory is fresher in Canada, which gained its independence from Britain a century after the U.S. did but that has grappled with nationalistic fervor in Quebec in recent decades.

Some Quebecers feel culturally threatened, fearing the erosion of their distinctness within a sea of English language and culture to the east and west of them in Canada and flooding up from the United States in the south. In the latest referendum on independence, in 1995, the “Yes” camp came within a percentage point of victory. While the majority doesn’t want to separate now, only a minority feels strong ties to Canada. Scots, like Quebecers before them, decided they’re better off with multiple identities in one country that’s struggling to prosper in a modern, interconnected world.

Yet another factor is the steady, albeit slow, progress toward democratization. Communities can at least voice their aspirations like never before, except in some notable instances. Restive communities that exist in China and Russia, for example, may not have an outlet like Scotland to test their desire for autonomy any time soon.

What appears certain, however is the inevitability of more economic blocs across the world and an accompanying increase in the cultural diversity of nations. And that will require the consideration of different political relationships. One solution, argues Tindale, of the Center for European Reform, is to adopt a model of federalism used by Germany or the United States, with clearly delineated authority embedded in constitutions, with substantial powers for states or regions.

In a bid to tip the balance toward “No”, all of the main political parties at Westminster agreed to fast track a proposal by Gordon Brown for new powers for Scotland. Some, naturally, asked why Brown didn’t do this while he was prime minister. The tactic, on the eve of an independence vote, may well have appeared expedient. But political change sometimes comes slowly, and is a delayed response to shifts in the public mood.

Yearnings for more autonomy aren’t extinguished once ballots have been cast and counted. While the “No” camps may pack their bags and head home victorious, “Yes” camps don’t forget and can’t be ignored.

Published in collaboration with Medium

Author: Gary Regenstreif, former Reuters Editor-at-Large, is a New York-based editor whose career included coverage of the separatist movement in his native Quebec.

Image: Catalunya’s separatist supporters wave “Esteladas” (Catalan separatist flags) supporting Scotland’s independence during FC Barcelona’s Champions League soccer match against Apoel Nicosia at Camp Nou stadium in Barcelona, September 17, 2014. REUTERS/Albert Gea